This paper considers the current regulatory framework of small-scale carbon sinks in the clean development mechanism (CDM). The legal characteristics are assessed from perspectives related to regulation theory. To what extent does CDM regulation support active biodiversity management in the small-scale implementation of afforestation and reforestation projects? After analysing the above question, fresh concepts for better consideration of biodiversity aspects during the implementation of small-scale carbon sink projects in developing countries are presented. These new concepts are examined in the framework of the current process of legal establishment, which seeks to encourage cost-effective project implementation in cases where biodiversity impacts are appropriately taken into account during small-scale projects. Is it possible to create a workable and plausible conceptual set-up for considering additional efforts to preserve and enhance biodiversity while sequestering carbon -and to do it in a way that makes it possible to reward those efforts in the CDM framework? These questions are discussed here in a multidisciplinary manner. It is found that biodiversity specialized carbon management, which includes the new concepts, can be seen as a potential small-scale project framework for maintaining biodiversity and local development in and around a small-scale project area.
Introduction
Carbon sink projects have been included into the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the arrangement under the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that allows industrialized countries that have committed to reducing or limiting greenhouse gas emissions to invest in projects that reduce emissions in developing countries as an alternative to more expensive emission reductions in their own countries (Decision 5/CMP.1). There is still a need to accumulate more practical experience in developing countries on implementing these projects. Small-scale implementation of carbon sink projects is one of the newest challenges. A long history of investment in small-scale forestry is common, for example, in Europe but not in developing countries (Harrison 2001) . Biodiversity levels are also generally high in developing countries (Huston and Marlan 2003) . Tropical forests contain 70% of the world's plants and animals, 70% of all vascular plants, 30% of all birds and more than 90% of all invertebrates (Sands 2005) . Although no small-scale carbon sink project activity has been registered by the Executive Board (EB) of the CDM thus far, many small-scale emission reduction project activities already exist. The biodiversity-rich developing countries with no history of small-scale forestry are the objects of judicial challenges: according to the CDM regulations administered by the United Nations, small-scale carbon sink projects must, at the same time, be cost-effective and ecologically sustainable. Harrison et al. (2002) noted a recent paradigm shift in the forestry sector to small-scale, multiple product-based, people-oriented and community-based sustainable forest management. The CDM has, since 2004, expanded the multiple product-based function of small-scale forestry in developing countries, adding the carbon sequestration function. Moreover, regarding the CDM's dual aim of achieving cost-effectiveness and sustainable development defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, biodiversity values are one more product of a small-scale project with legally-binding status. The legal frameworks of biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration need to be integrated. The conceptual framework of this institutional interplay between the biodiversity and climate change regimes is still being developed (Kim 2004) . Despite its incompleteness, this development is in line with the recent trend in environmental law, from a more sectoral approach to a more integrated one (Faure and Niessen 2006a) .
Attempts to rise to the cost-effectiveness challenges have led to arguments that the current maximum limit of 8 kt of CO 2 sequestered per year for a small-scale carbon sink project is not high enough, and should be further increased to improve the cost-effectiveness of small-scale carbon sink projects (FCCC 2007) . The implications of possible changes on the limit for small-scale afforestation and reforestation CDM project activities were reassessed at the Bali Conference in 2007 (Decision 9/CMP.3), which also decided to limit the maximum amount of CO 2 sequestered to 1 kt of CO 2 per year. This new limit 'will expand the number and geographical reach of the CDM to countries that have thus far been unable to take part in the mechanism for this category of project activities' (UNFCCC 2007) .
The cost-effectiveness of small-scale projects could be improved by including the biodiversity values of the project impacts into the amount/price of temporary certified emission reductions (tCERs) or long-term certified emission reductions (lCERs) -as well as the idea of small-scale project implementation, which also has the potential to be socio-economically and environmentally beneficial. Could including the goal of biodiversity conservation into carbon sink regulation much more intensively than at present be a legal-technical way to increase the cost-effectiveness of small-scale projects -even after this new doubled limit? This should be studied in greater detail, since we may easily face the traditional counter-arguments and facts against large-scale plantations in the tropics and subtropics if most carbon sink projects in the CDM are large-scale. This kind of development in CDM forestry is neither politically nor environmentally wise; in contrast, small-scale carbon sinks could be promoted as local biodiversity-friendly carbon sequestration. Michaelowa's (2007) argument supports this idea. Hence, this paper investigates what could be the conceptual basis for biodiversity-specialized carbon management under the current small-scale CDM project framework. Biodiversity-specialized carbon management refers to carbon management that also includes biodiversity aspects in carbon management decisions. This paper also examines how small-scale implementation of carbon sink projects is currently regulated from the perspective of biodiversity conservation, and reviews the current incentives in the regulations to enhance biodiversity levels in carbon forestry project areas. Additionally, the paper should serve as a point of orientation for those not familiar with recent detailed regulations concerning the small-scale carbon sink projects in the CDM and regulatory linkages with biodiversity conservation. A general regulation theory framework is used to examine the regulations concerning small-scale carbon sink projects in the CDM and regulatory linkages with biodiversity conservation in an integrative and multidisciplinary approach. This is done in the spirit of building bridges by using well-known concepts in environmental law, ecology and law-and-economics.
Conceptual framework and methodological issues
No specific regulation theory -for example, the economic theory of regulation -is used, but rather the general mindset of a broad literature on regulation theory is adapted to analyse the suitability of the current legal framework for taking into account and providing incentives for implementing small-scale CDM projects that are biodiversity-friendly. As ecologically-oriented valuation has, to date, been the main approach within biodiversity conservation (Mertz et al. 2007) , this multidisciplinary approach is innovative.
The legal complexity of small-scale carbon sinks is evaluated to allow discussion of the possibilities of including the goal of biodiversity more deeply into small-scale implementation of CDM forestry. Here, the phrase '. . .are developed or implemented by low-income communities and individuals as determined by the host Party' in the definition of small-scale carbon sinks is important (Decision 19/CP.9). Corbera and Brown (2008) found that, in Mexico, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private organizations claim that the CDM has already become so complex that it limits the ability to participate. Such development is against the legislative quality indicator of accessibility, which requires that regulation be clear and accessible to the regulatees (Faure and Niessen 2006b) . Jenkins et al. (2004) argued that biodiversity markets are the newest and most challenging of the ecosystem service markets. Thorough inclusion of biodiversity as a goal for the project cycle places new demands on participating institutions -and on the whole regulatory process, since lawmaking is a political process. Kägi and Langauer (2000) optimistically argued that it would be possible to avoid the environmental risks of monoculture projects with exotic species by formulating regulations and guidelines that are proper in the sense of environmental protection. However, the costs of the regulatory process can be surprisingly high, especially if the biodiversity issues are approached as fully as they could be. Many of the impacts on biodiversity are difficult to predict. While even the scale of biodiversity impacts is difficult to predict, the fact that the simplified modalities and procedures of the small-scale carbon sink projects in the CDM enhance incentives for cursory project implementation suggests that these issues should be studied in greater detail and taken into greater account (Beckman et al. 2006) . It is argued here that an active biodiversity management approach, or 'biodiversity specialized carbon management' -and grounds for it in regulation -are needed. Specialized management attempts to generate multiple values at a landscape level (Boscolo and Vincent 2003) . This raises the need for new concepts about biodiversity management (Boscolo and Vincent 2003) : new legal concepts related to biodiversity specialized carbon management are recommended in this paper for the legal substance of small-scale CDM regulation.
The existing literature relevant to the topic of this paper establishes most of the definitions and typologies for analysis. The primary focus of the analysis is on recent research papers in forest ecology, biodiversity economics, climate policy and law-and-economics. They will be used as secondary data. Moreover, an important framework for analysis is adapted from the source of the law itself -i.e. here, the regulations of the Kyoto Protocol. The procedures and modalities of the CDM afforestation and reforestation activities have since 1997 been regulated through negotiations in the Conferences of Parties (COPs) to the UNFCCC. At the time of writing, the decisions for those activities had only been made for the first commitment period. Consequently, the process of legal establishment is still in a dynamic state. The unique regulatory process of the CDM sink projects implemented on a small-scale -which started in early 2004is systematized in a chronological framework. It must also be pointed out that publications related to the costs of conservation and their relevance to planning have only recently started increasing -and include only sporadic reviews accessible to ecologists and conservation biologists (Naidoo et al. 2006) .
Relevant legal framework
The ninth COP in Milan in 2003 adopted modalities and procedures regarding the inclusion of carbon sequestration activities in the CDM, both for normal-scale project types as determined in Decision 19/CP.9 and small-scale carbon sink projects. The modalities and procedures for small-scale projects were simplified: given the private sector nature of the CDM, the rationale behind this was the desire to reduce transaction costs of these projects. The simplified modalities and procedures include the following: project bundling, simplified project design documents requirements, simplified baseline methodologies, simplified monitoring plans, and a common operational entity for validation, verification and certification (Decision 6/CMP.1). Fragmentation of normal project activity into smaller parts is not allowed because of a debundling clause (Decision 6/ CMP.1).
Afforestation and reforestation are differentiated on the basis of land history. The former occurs on land that did not contain forest for at least 50 years, while the latter occurs on land that did not contain forest by the end of 1989. Heiskanen (2006) and Dutschke (2007) have recommended that afforestation and reforestation projects could be treated in the CDM only as one shared conceptual project category in order to simplify unnecessary dichotomies. According to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, projects to prevent deforestation are ineligible in the CDM, at least in the first commitment period, 2008-2012. Illegal logging in developing countries is often difficult to supervise and control (Ravenel et al. 2005) . About a fifth of global CO 2 emissions are generated by deforestation (Huston and Marlan 2003; Chomitz et al. 2007 ); however, the REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) mechanism could complement afforestation and reforestation projects in the CDM in the future (Blaustein et al. 2007 ).
The concept of 'small-scale carbon sink' is defined in the Annex of Decision 19/CP.9, but additional refinements and clarifications are necessary; for example, with regard to low-income communities and individuals (Minang et al. 2007) . Clarity is important because an established interpretation of the definitions is the goal of small-scale CDM regulation, and will provide legal certainty. The current definition of small-scale afforestation and reforestation activities, to be interpreted by the project administration, is:
'Small-scale afforestation and reforestation project activities under the CDM are those that are expected to result in net anthropogenic greenhouse gas removals by sinks of less than 8 kt of CO 2 per year and are developed or implemented by low-income communities and individuals as determined by the host Party. If a small-scale afforestation or reforestation project activity under the CDM results in net anthropogenic greenhouse gas removals by sinks greater than 8 kt of CO 2 per year, the excess removals will not be eligible for the issuance of tCERs or lCERs.'
The regulatory update for Decision 19/CP.9 is Decision 6/ CMP.1. It grants eligibility to the following four subtypes of the small-scale afforestation and reforestation project activities: converting grassland, cropland, wetland or settlement to forested land. In addition, project participants may submit new subtypes to the Executive Board for approval. From the point of view of regulatory history, it should be also noted that the landmark Decision 19/CP.9 has been a continuum of certain decisions of the seventh and eight COPs. Small-scale afforestation and reforestation projects must comply with all the regulatory requirements mentioned in these decisions, which include: Decision 11/CP.7, Decision 15/CP.7, Decision 17/ CP.7, Decision 19/CP.7, Decision 20/CP.7, Decision 21/CP.7, Decision 22/CP.7, Decision 22/CP.8, and Decision 23/CP.8. All the regulations are available publicly.
Soft law instruments have provided flexibility for legislative work because project developers have had a chance to propose their own methodologies. In general, 'soft law refers to international norms that are deliberately non-binding in character but still have legal relevance' ). There have also been calls for public input into proposed new methodologies (Decision 7/CMP.1). These soft approaches to law-making indicate sound development from the point of view of operational flexibility. Operational flexibility is defined as a flexibility of regulatees to choose the technical, organizational and other solutions for achieving regulatory objectives (Määttä 2008) . Practical legislative work by the COPs has now continued for almost 4 years. The first version of the project design document for small-scale afforestation and reforestation projects was recently completed (CDM-SSC-AR-PDD 2007). Due to the rapid drafting of laws, legal security has not always been high.
According to this confirmed self-regulation process, in February 2007, the COPs serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol received submissions concerning the views of the Parties on the implications of changing the limit established for small-scale afforestation and reforestation project activities. Many of the parties agreed that increasing the current 8 kt limit to 32 kt would facilitate better utilization of small-scale CDM sink projects in developing countries, since the current limit means that these projects are seen to be barely cost-effective. Germany, on behalf of the European Union and its Member States, has been far more conservative in its stance, stating that any review or change to the limit set in the definition of small-scale afforestation and reforestation project activities should be carefully assessed. This perspective also underscores the fact that it is too early to conclude that increasing the maximum carbon sequestration limit will promote the development of small-scale afforestation and reforestation project activities.
Some of the issues related to implementation of the small-scale carbon sink projects in developing countries are decided individually by host countries, the developing countries where the small-scale carbon sink projects are implemented. As these countries have the right to determine the requirements for sustainable project implementation, they are allowed to define national sustainable development criteria for small-scale carbon sink projects. Consequently, the assessment of sustainable development is an issue of national sovereignty. The current regulatory framework of the CDM is inconsistent because the decisions require defining national sustainable development criteria, but in the current regulatory framework of the CDM it has not been determined how this should be done. Heuberger et al. (2007) also underlined the fact that the definition of sustainability is generally still vague.
The wide and open-ended objectives are likely to be subject to varied interpretation nationally. Defining sustainable development criteria at national level is also somewhat questionable because there is no tradition of small-scale forestry in developing countries (Harrison 2001) . Further, as Zhang (2006) pointed out, individual governments have flexibility in choices to define so-called priority eligibility criteria and implement socalled priority projects. There is a danger that the first and only priority is to choose the mitigation options that sequester most carbon (Zhang 2006) .
The current dominant practice in forestry in developing countries is that the various environmental goals are not pursued jointly, but independently (Cowie et al. 2007) . It is also evident that the interplay between the biodiversity and climate change regimes is not strong (Kim 2004) . The regulatory framework of the CDM in this respect is shortsighted and has been unsuccessful from the standpoint of the legislative quality indicator of legality: law should be non-retrospective, ascertainable and clear, according to the legality principle. The work of the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group (AHTEG) on Biodiversity and Climate Change of the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) has been important in this respect (Kim 2004) . The distribution of the regulatory burden related to designing the criteria for biodiversity conservation is not left entirely to the developing countries. Ellis et al. (2007) have noted that many developing countries are not able to risk large investments in the institutional infrastructure of the CDM. Despite this problem, the rules for impact assessment and the project approval procedure must be in place at the national and subnational levels (Minang et al. 2007 ). Related to this challenging situation, Faure and Niessen (2006b) have stressed that foreign legal experts have often underestimated the fragility of institutional frameworks in developing countries. Consequently, local expertise and knowledge must be used more thoroughly than in the past. (2004) has observed that the evolving rules and regulations of the Kyoto Protocol have been increasingly divergent from those of the CBD. The differentiation of these regulatory regimes is not rational from the point of view of carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation. For example, afforestation of areas used by intensive agricultural practices can bring about higher biodiversity (Schelhaas et al. 2006) . Synergistic possibilities between biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration are not presently utilized, although these ecosystem services are functionally interdependent due to their ecological interdependence. The existing initial integration can already be seen as suitable development at the project level, because some obstacles facing smallholders will be reduced in carbon markets compared with markets for agricultural and traditional forestry commodities. The basic idea of smallscale implementation is sound. Consequently, a system of financial incentives for taking biodiversity impacts seriously into account during small-scale carbon sequestration activity could be created to improve the existing situation. Karani and Gantsho (2007) pointed out that, in general, innovation and entrepreneurship are needed to solve the complexity of integrating the CDM with sustainable development. However, one has to be careful in solving the above-mentioned complexity (Tassone et al. 2004 ).
Discussion

Kim
The International Finance Corporation of the World Bank has proposed that biodiversity could be marketed in a similar fashion to removal of CO 2 from the atmosphere (Cowie et al. 2007 ). Jenkins et al. (2004) pointed out that the nations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) should create initiatives to utilize carbon markets for biodiversity conservation. Geographically speaking, development finance institutions can be seen as key players in promoting CDM activities towards achieving Africa's sustainable development needs (Karani and Gantsho 2007) . Carbon sink projects implemented on a small-scale could be pilot studies for these purposes, to address the following question: is it possible to create a workable and plausible conceptual set-up for considering additional efforts to conserve and enhance biodiversity while sequestering carbon -and do so in a way where it is possible to reward those efforts in the CDM framework? For developing countries, the legal establishment of the CDM can be improved in many ways; but a holistic approach to CDM regulation for integrating biodiversity and carbon sink goals at the project level should not be left only to the developing countries.
National and sub-national policy considerations have had only a small role in the design of carbon management within the CDM (Minang et al. 2007 ). For example, not enough is known about the extent of the adjustments in carbon sink policies that are needed to support capacity-building in developing countries. Related to the above-mentioned challenges, there are already some wellestablished benchmarks for assessing the success of both CDM and Joint Implementation (JI) projects. Every CDM project should meet benchmarks of additionality, permanence and non-leakage. Parallel key benchmarks for biodiversity conservation and enhancement could also be implemented. In this way, biodiversity-friendly CDM projects could be putt together by authorities and project developers. These parallel legislative cornerstones would facilitate both supervision and enforcement. Biodiversity additionality, biodiversity permanence and biodiversity leakage could be demonstrated and assessed.
The biodiversity level of degraded land can often be increased by small-scale afforestation or reforestation. This is possible when an investor implements such a project by means of a well-designed restoration plan. In such cases, the additionality of the biodiversity values (i.e. the enhancement level of the biodiversity values at a project site) would somehow be rewarded in the final amount of tCERs/lCERs acquired from the project. Ecologically speaking, this additionality could also be called biodiversity accumulation. Another possibility would be for developing countries to receive payments tied to measured increase in biodiversity before and after a project. The regulatory alternatives to sanctioning the factors of the project implementation that threaten biodiversity -e.g. loss of biodiversity because of invasive species used at the project site -are not discussed in this paper.
Payments for carbon sequestration have been seen as promising for local people from the local development perspective (Pfaff et al. 2007 ). Operationalizing a reward system based on new concepts is another question. However, this reward system could be called a biodiversity supplement system (BSS), and could be a new synthesizing regulatory goal that is capable of implementation. The BSS would be the legislative institution for integrating the new biodiversity concepts into the general criteria of the CDM. This requires adopting a not-so-conservative approach in law-making. For example, such biodiversity-friendly CDM credits would require project developers to achieve a minimum standard of permanent biodiversity enhancement while implementing a carbon sink project.
The recommendations regarding the biodiversityfriendly subtypes of small-scale CDM sink projects could be submitted to the Executive Board, as recommended in Appendix B of the Annex of Decision 6/CMP.1. Correspondingly, if the biodiversity level is reduced at a project site (such activity could be called 'biodiversity nonpermanence') or outside the project site ('pernicious biodiversity leakage'), then a separate biodiversity enhancement project could be implemented to offset the damage caused by the carbon sink project. To date, there has been no largescale financing mechanism even for the payments that concentrate solely on biodiversity conservation (Chomitz et al. 2007) ; and there are no incentives to protect or enhance biodiversity values during a CDM project. Furthermore, the spatial variability of costs, which are related to taking biodiversity aspects into account during project implementation, can be huge (Naidoo 2006) .
Biodiversity permanence -comparable to the concept of 'biodiversity maintenance' used by biologists (e.g. Vandermeer 2006) -could be demanded of every smallscale afforestation or reforestation project activity under the CDM from the early stage of a project to its end: the biodiversity level cannot be allowed to diminish because of a carbon sequestration project. Equally, negative impacts could not be transferred outside the project area ('pernicious biodiversity leakage'). Project impacts for ecosystem resilience could be taken into account (Iovanna and Newbold 2007) . Ecosystem resilience refers to the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed by an ecosystem before it moves from one stable state to another (Holling 1973) . For example, areas adjacent to protected areas have important role in promoting ecosystem resilience and ecosystem functioning (e.g. Lundberg and Moberg 2003; Wilson and Guenau 2004) . The starting point would be a baseline study report that includes measurements of biodiversity (e.g. Weikard et al. 2006) . The time scale for monitoring biodiversity permanence can be longer than for monitoring permanence of carbon sequestration (Chazdon 2003) . Dutschke (2002) has warned about the possibility of perverse incentives to convert natural ecosystems with relatively low-tree cover into high-tree density plantations under the CDM framework. So, the new biodiversy concepts could be useful for taking into account the biodiversity issues to avoid such perverse incentives in carbon management. However, reformulating the regulation of small-scale carbon sink projects by adding more requirements for biodiversity monitoring may raise monitoring costs, because aerial methods (remote sensing) are generally used to monitor carbon sequestration, whereas monitoring biodiversity impacts requires more labour-intensive ground-truthing methods. Monitoring both ecosystem services would need the application of quantitative approaches for project assessment (Heuberger et al. 2007 ). These issues are worth further study.
The new biodiversity concepts -such as biodiversity additionality -can be also valuable for the national organizations of the CDM when they offer workable small-scale project ideas to potential investors, as it can be demonstrated that potential biodiversity impacts during the proposed project have been analysed. Niessen (2006) has stressed the view of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) that institutional arrangements usually need to be developed at multiple levels to cope with the specificity of the environmental issues and provide the correct incentives to the users at each level of the hierarchy. Jenkins et al. (2004) stated that new institutions have to be created for this purpose. Minang et al. (2007) have also stated that particular attention should be given to institutional development.
In each country, one existing CDM institution is the Designated National Authority (DNA), to which information on environmental impacts is submitted. Consequently, the DNA can play a more important and clearer role in integrating the biodiversity and carbon sequestration goals of a project in order to enhance the multifunctionality of CDM forests. This would also be a desirable development from the point of view of the principle of legality. The proactive role of the DNA is important here. Skjaerseth (2006) pointed out that duplication of work and coordination problems lead to low effectiveness; this is undesirable in terms of administrative efficiency.
Giving the DNA institution the functions of the biodiversity supplement system (BSS) could have many new pragmatic applications for integrating biodiversity goals into a small-scale carbon sink project. For example, project bundling coordinated by the DNA could be designed to create biodiversity-rich ecological corridors while sequestering carbon. The spaces between the borders of the individual small-scale project areas could be seen as areas of particular importance to biodiversity with regard to biodiversity leakage, which may be favourable or pernicious (e.g. Naughton-Treves et al. 2005; Scales and Marsden 2008) . For example, favourable biodiversity leakage happens when functional connectivity increases, causing positive biodiversity impacts. Functional connectivity emphasizes process thinking: it refers to the connectivity of a forested area for a process, such as the movement of a rare animal species through the landscape of small-scale forest patches. Paltto et al. (2006) demonstrated the advantage of the landscape perspective, especially in the context of fragmented forests. The landscape level of ecosystems is also a natural common base where both economic and ecological processes take place (Verboom et al. 2007 ). Consequently, Hsiaofei et al. (2007) have noted that the principles of landscape ecology are an interesting theoretical framework for ecological regulation through the optimization of landscape patterns.
Landscape management can often enable species migration (Dutschke 2007) . While through implementing smallscale afforestation projects in the tropics, one could, for example, concentrate on longer rotations. Schelhaas et al. (2006) pointed out that trees with larger diameters are exceptionally important for birds and insects. In addition, pest control cannot be used as a business-as-usual activity in forest management; Klironomos (2002) has argued that the role of parasite diversity in controlling invasive species is important.
In the first phase of a carbon sink project, the planted area could be designed mainly for optimizing carbon sequestration, while the border areas could be dedicated more clearly to preserve or enhance biodiversity. Consequently, these areas would perform a corridor function, for example, for species migration and gene exchange (i.e. favourable biodiversy leakage). For example, cacao (Theobroma cacao) trees have an important corridor function between forest fragments, if they are managed soundly (Franzen and Mulder 2007) . Opdam and Wascher (2004) recommended a shift in strategy from protected areas towards landscape networks. Project implementation on the small scale also enhances well-balanced geographical distribution of projects (Michaelowa 2007) . Thus, it could be possible to improve the biodiversity values of large-scale carbon sink projects by debundling a large-scale project to include ecological corridors between fragmented project areas. At the moment, the debundling clause in the CDM prohibits fragmenting a large project into smaller ones. Heuberger et al. (2007) stressed that it is important to discuss the sustainability effects of individual forestry projects on an operational level. The new concepts introduced here enhance cooperation between experts in carbon sequestration and biodiversity conservation. At present, the idea of considering biodiversity in a single developing country may often be forgotten. Greiner and Michaelowa (2003) have criticized the concept of investment additionality because it will exclude those projects that are most cost-effective; perhaps biodiversity additionality could substitute for investment additionality in the project requirements because its determination would be more logical.
The official unilateral mode of small-scale CDM does not make biodiversity conservation easier during a project cycle. The developed countries are likely to purchase carbon credits, no matter how specious they are from the point of view of biodiversity. Related to this, Boyd et al. (2007) pointed out that a current problem for small-scale farming is the unavailability of technical assistance to small farmers. Conceptual support would be helpful here because it would strengthen the legal-technical capacity of project developers and authorities to tackle biodiversity issues. It can be noted that a major research area in ecology for the past 10 years has been the role of biodiversity in maintaining the functioning of ecosystems (Savage et al. 2007) , resulting in much useful knowledge. Moreover, several biodiversity aspects are likely to co-prosper with the alleviation of diverse poverty aspects (Franzen and Mulder 2007) .
Project participants can address biodiversity additionality, biodiversity permanence and biodiversity leakage at the project design stage, using the structure of existing management contracts that detail biodiversity management activities. For instance, the size of a small-scale project area in hectares will depend on carbon sequestration capacity of the tree species planted (Kirby and Potvin 2007) . Selected tree species also have an effect on biodiversity (Sarlo 2006) . Even scattered trees can be highly significant for biodiversity, as they can act as nurse plants or fertility islands (Manning et al. 2006 ). Terborgh (1986) argued that the structure of the vertebrate community is in danger of collapse if keystone plant species are removed. Consequently, 'a tree here and another there' has a different meaning for biodiversity experts than for experts calculating how much absorbed carbon they represent. Evans (1992) noted that a fast-growing Pinus plantation might lock up 5 t of CO 2 per hectare a year, and a eucalypt plantation two or three times as much. However, pines and eucalypts are often not endemic to a project area. Just as earlier afforestations in Western Europe were aimed at production, with the introduction of conifers (Schelhaas et al. 2006) , the same inconsiderate routine is now transferred to land in developing countries. Ecological processes are not maintained well when forest biodiversity is not conserved effectively (Spanos and Feest 2007) . However, there is currently a lack of empirical evidence for the statement that biodiversity maintains ecosystem services (Mertz et al. 2007) . Indigenous species can be seen as desirable from the biodiversity point of view. However, if the capacity of exotic species to sequester carbon is greater than that of endemic species -and there is no system such as the biodiversity supplement system (BSS) in use -indigenous species are not likely to be used.
Conclusions
Conceptualizing biodiversity protection and enhancement is important in the carbon sink context in general, and specifically in the context of the legal framework of the CDM. Small-scale sink projects in the CDM require much more active biodiversity management in local areas in the host country than is currently encouraged in the CDM regulations.
This paper introduces the concepts of biodiversity additionality, biodiversity permanence and biodiversity leakage. Biodiversity additionality refers to the enhancement of the biodiversity values at a project site. Using this benchmark means that the difference in the biodiversity level before and after a project must be measured. In addition, the net biodiversity impacts of an individual project must be taken into account as valid outcomes of the individual project. Biodiversity leakage may be favourable or pernicious. At a minimum, biodiversity non-leakage as a biodiversityneutral project outcome is the desired baseline situation if it can be determined at a project design stage that a project cannot lead to positive biodiversity outcomes outside a project area. Pernicious biodiversity leakage should not be allowed to occur. Biodiversity permanence is mainly a temporal concept, as safeguarding biodiversity should be permanent or at least long term. If the biodiversity level is reduced during the project period, biodiversity non-permanence occurs. In brief, these concepts strengthen the capacity of project developers and authorities to tackle biodiversity issues.
The new concepts will structure and better emphasizeas the terms already in use do in their own context -the importance of biodiversity as a goal of an individual smallscale project. It is also important to remember that each developing country is entitled to define ecological sustainability nationally; yet this is likely to be an impediment to the biodiversity-friendly implementation of small-scale carbon sink projects. By creating the above-mentioned concepts and the legislative-institutional framework, the biodiversity impacts would be internalized within the decision-making process of the project cycle, and regarded as direct impacts of the project. In the absence of such biodiversity-friendly modification of the CDM regulation, the project implementation will be guided by economic considerations related only to optimizing carbon sequestration.
These new concepts and the biodiversity supplement system could also be useful in stimulating action for reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries. At the moment, such approaches are being sought in the Conferences of the Parties (Decision 2/CP.13). Preventing deforestation is currently not considered, however, under the CDM. In general, it should be emphasized that integrating carbon and biodiversity assessments requires the motivation to look beyond the boundaries of different disciplines. Cowie A, Schneider UA, Montanarella L. 2007. Potential synergies between existing multilateral environmental agreements in the implementation of land use, land-use change and forestry activities. Environ Sci Policy. 10(4):335-352. Decision 2/CP.13. Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to stimulate action. Decision 5/CMP.1. Modalities and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the clean development mechanism in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Decision 6/CMP.1. Simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale afforestation and reforestation project activities under the clean development mechanism in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and measures to facilitate their implementation. Decision 7/CMP.1. Further guidance relating to the clean development mechanisms. Decision 9/CMP.3. Implications of possible changes to the limit for small-scale afforestation and reforestation clean development mechanism project activities. Decision 11/CP.7. Land use, Land use change and forestry. Decision 15/CP.7. Modalities and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the clean development mechanism in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Decision 17/CP.7. Modalities and procedures for a clean development, as defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. Decision 19/CP.7. Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism, as defined in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. Decision 19/CP.9. Modalities and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the clean development mechanism in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Decision 20/CP.7. Modalities and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the clean development mechanism in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Decision 21/CP.7. Guidance to the executive board. Decision 22/CP.7. Modalities and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under the clean development mechanism in the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Decision 22/CP.8. Additional sections to be incorporated in the guidelines for the Preparation of the information required under Article 7, and in the guidelines for the review of information under Article 8, of the Kyoto Protocol.
